I
Let us begin by acl<nowledging that Christianity is-in some as-yet-tobe-determined sense-^fundamentally "transpolitical." Kraynak is quite right, and in accord with the tradition, to point to the Synoptic logion concerning what is owed to God and what is owed to Caesar (Mt 22:21; Mk 12:17; Lk 20:25). Indeed, one of the most impressive parts of Kraynak's argument is his observation that both collectivist and liberal accounts of the relation between the "spiritual and temporal realms" tend toward a kind of reduction. This tendency is manifest in various Marxist-inspired trends in modern theology, such as in the work of Gustavo Gutierrez (Kraynak, 255) . And it is present as well in various sorts of totalitarian regimes, in that such regimes turn the state, which controls every aspect of human life through juridical and physical coercion, into a kind of idol (Kraynak, (186) (187) . Now, Kraynak's response to these tendencies might seem to suggest a replication of the liberal and neoconservative distinction between the public and private spheres. Thus the distinction would perhaps seem to support, rather than confront, the liberal model. Certainly, preventing the absorption of the spiritual into the secular realm is precisely what liberalism purports to accomplish. But Kraynak's primary argument is instead that liberalism fails to maintain the proper distinction between the "spiritual and temporal realms."
As he rightly points out, almost all of modern Christianity, after some initial and significant resistance, has now rushed headlong to embrace liberal democracy and individual rights as fully consistent with, and even implied by. Christian revelation regarding the nature and dignity of the human person. It seems selfevident to almost everyone (including devout Christians) that inviolable private rights, the liberal sense of individual freedom, and democratic self-government constitute in principle the only foundation for a truly just society As Kraynak argues, however, liberal democracy in fact tends to subvert Christianity even as it claims to secure a "private" space, in the form of individual rights, necessary for its unimpeded practice. When we ask what a liberal sense of human dignity is, liberalism can go no further than to affirm (tautologically and nihilistically) that this dignity is grounded in "inalienable rights." The modern "synthesis" of liberal democracy and Christianity, therefore, attempts to subordinate rights to the fundamental Christian understanding of human dignity based on relation to God, on man's status as Imago Dei (Kraynak, 159) . But this subordination is difficult in practice to maintain, and rights tend to reemerge as a kind of first principle according to which all else, including the hierarchical structures of the Church (and by implication even the human relation to God), must be measured. Hence we are left with an unsustainable tension. Liberal democracy "needs" Christianity, if it is to avoid falling into a nihilistic failure to offer any foundation for its vaunted protection of personal "dignity," but all the while it undermines Christianity because it tends to supplant Christianity's understanding of the source of human dignity with its own fundamental positivism (and finally nihilism). Effectively, liberalism reconfigures Christianity into its own interpretation of man. The result is that legitimate hierarchy (whether ecclesial or secular), as well as the basic sense of creation as gift and the response of creaturely gratitude, are rendered unintelligible to the modern mind. The symptoms are everywhere: mass culture, a consumerist society, an obsession with technological mastery over nature, an ethos of economic and social selfdetermination, and so forth (Kraynak, 25 other, each of which imposes a civil or legal code through divine law (Kraynak, 72) . Here, we might say, the absorption is from above. The problem with theocracy, then, is that the Church imposes herself juridically on the secular order, dictating the state's political life through a usurpation of its temporal sovereignty (Kraynak, cf. 188).
II
Certainly, no one should gainsay the importance of stressing "d/st/nct/on but not a separation!' But as I mentioned, Kraynak's use of this idea is also a source of difficulty for his argument. In order to see this difficulty we might start by examining a famous passage from John Paul II:
The Incarnation of God the Son signifies the taking up into unity with
God not only of human nature, but in this ht/mon nature, in a sense, of everything that is "flesh": the whole of humanity, the entire visible and material world. The Incarnation, then, also has a cosmic significance, a cosmic dimension. The "first-born of all creation," becoming incarnate in the individual humanity of Christ, unites himself in some way with the entire reality of man, which is also "flesh"-and in this reality with all "flesh" with the whole of creation.^ A number of important points can be drawn from this passage. First, for Christians, no part of creation can be abstracted from its origin and destiny in Jesus Christ without compromising its fundamental integrity and meaning.
The "whole of humanity," "the entire reality of man," and indeed all of creation is taken up into unity with God in Christ's Incarnation. But most importantly this "taking up into unity with God" is not an end that is imposed on human reality from without. Rather, unity with God in Christ is the destiny of "all flesh" from the beginning. As the "first-born of all creation," in and for whom 
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Not only does the Church make human reality her own, but also she "is the place of the continued embodiment of God in the world, a reality that radiates forth and wells up beyond her own self."^ As Hans Urs von Balthasar puts it:
It is only in a superficial perspective that the Church can be called a If what I have said thus far is true, then the Church's only real mission, to "evangelize" (John Paul II speaks of the "new evangelization") all "flesh," all of human reality, means to bring the fundamental structures of human community into conformity not with her juridical structure, but with her own interior,
Marian structure as a communion of persons {communio personarum).^
Moreover, then, if it is true that the Church is a "societas perfecta 'alongside' the secular (civil) society" only from a "superficial perspective," it is also true that "secular (civil) society" is a societas perfecta alongside the Church only superficially.
Ill
If we turn our attention, then, to the sense of "distinction but not a separation" suggested by Kraynak, we may highlight the following passage, one which is echoed throughout the book in a number of different forms and which captures a core element of Kraynak's main argument:
[T]he distinction of the Two Cities means that the spiritual and the political realms are instituted by God and accountable to God; but they are guided by different kinds of law and serve different ends. The spiritual realm, or City of God, is guided by divine law and an order of charity, holiness, and grace that serves the highest end, eternal salvation. The temporal realm or earthly city is guided by natural law which prudence formulates into human or civil law for the secondary ends of the temporal realm.^ What is most striking in this passage is that the relationship between "the spiritual and the political realms" is framed in terms of distinct juridical structures, one "guided by divine law" and the other by natural and civil law.
CRAWFORD 81 one serving the highest end and the other serving secondary ends. The "unity" between the two "realms" arises from their both being ordained by God for human happiness; the distinction arises in the nature of that happiness ("temporal" versus "eternal") and in the different kinds of law by which they are guided ("natural" and "civil" versus "divine").'° Now, Kraynak's concern is clear and unassailable. In order to preclude the reduction of creation and redemption, in either direction, it is necessary to maintain their "distinctness." Neither an assimilation "from below," such as happens when worldly structures shape the order of "charity, holiness and grace," nor an assimilation "from above," where the structures of the world are supplanted by divine law or ecclesiastical power, can be reconciled with authentic Christian teaching. The precise character of this "distinctness" is nevertheless crucial if we are to avoid certain problems, such as the tendency toward a complete disconnection between faith and daily, political and economic life, that is to say, a false secularization. We should immediately add that Kraynak intends to address this issue by placing the "temporal realm"
hierarchically under the "spiritual realm" and by including in the ends of the state the promotion of virtue and piety However, a false secularization necessarily and by definition occurs wherever, and precisely insofar as, nature is viewed (at least tacitly) as structurally and ontologically "closed."
In order that "divine positive law" not be reduced to pure positivism, that is to say, to a voluntaristic or nominalistic extrinsicism, it is crucial to see that divine law appeals to the deepest inclinations (the desiderium naturale) of the creature." We could say, then, that divine positive law comes as a gift that answers the deepest yearnings of the natural law itself. The "order of charity, holiness and grace" is, therefore, not most felicitously conceived as a parallel juridical "realm." Rather, the discussion up to now should show us that grace brings the temporal order to a paradoxical fulfillment "beyond itself." Language, such as "independence...
[but] not entirely independent," (Kraynak, 87) or "semi-independence" (Kraynak, 86) or "the spiritual and temporal realms" or "spheres" to describe this "distinctness," tends to generate an overly-neat division between grace and nature, or the Church and the world. So while Kraynak is certainly right to emphasize the Christian distinction, or even "infinite distance," between man's worldly ("temporal") existence (the saeculum) and his destiny in divine life, at times this distinction seems to fall into a kind of extrinsicism, as though the two "realms," the "Two Cities,"'^ relate simply as two "things," lying ("semi-independently") alongside each other His argument is ambiguous, then, insofar as it tends to obscure the fundamental "openness" of "all flesh," including the state, the economy, society and the culture-as part of what John Paul calls "the entire reality of man"-^to the "supernatural order of charity, holiness, and grace."
As a result Kraynak sorts out various realities according to whether they are "spiritual" (the Church, the sacramental life, the family, charity, holiness.
82 CATHOLIC SOCL\L SCIENCE REVIEW grace, etc.) or "temporar' (government, politics, economy, civil law, military, etc.). But, as the passage from Balthasar indicates, the categories are not, in reality, so neat. The family, for example, is both sacred and secular, both as existing above the temporal as the superior order Rather, the "supernatural order of charity, holiness, and grace" enters the world, and transforms it from within, as de Lubac says,"inspiring it to be Christian and thereby more human."
What is really at stake in our understanding of "distinction but not a separation" is, therefore, not so much a correct hierarchy of juridical orders as it is an adequate theological anthropology and its implied culture.
Of course Kraynak is well aware that the political and economic orders cannot be abstracted from the implications of Christianity, and he argues that Christianity implies at least political hierarchy and even, ideally, some form of "constitutional monarchy."'^ He is aware that what makes liberalism particularly dangerous for Christianity is that it comes as an alternate interpretation of man, rather than (at least initially) as a competing or coercively imposed juridical structure. Indeed, it is ingredient in his main thesis that liberalism, as a form of political economy, not only dictates a sense of political rights and economic exchange, but also mediates an entire (false) theological anthropology. "The state, the economy, the arrangement of social classes, the military, and the rules of warfare," not to mention "human or civil law," invariably and unavoidably both embody and mediate some theological anthropology. They cannot be abstracted from culture, and culture cannot be abstracted from the sacred, ecc/es/a/ and sacramental order of grace and charity.
It is the task of the Church to bring to the culture, and therefore to all of its CRAWFORD 83 political, economic, and legal institutions, an authentic interpretation of "the entire reality of man." It is this last point that will largely inform our understanding of the "transpolitical" (or "transeconomic," or "translegal") character of Christianity Notes
